A Dove Among Hawks: Moshe Sharett –
the Political Tragedy of an Israeli Leader
Ya'akov Sharett
YA'AKOV SHARETT is a retired
journalist and the eldest son of Moshe Sharett. He served in the Jewish Brigade
in
Moderation or escalation - these
were the two basic alternatives in the entwined domains of foreign and defense
policies confronting Israel's leadership immediately after the historic and
bloody victory in the War of Independence in 1948-1949, and that have
confronted government after government unceasingly to this very day. It was the
choice of history that these two contradictory and fateful alternatives were
first epitomized by David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett. These two outstanding
leaders had stood together at the helm of the Yishuv - the Jewish
community of
It took
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But how did it all start How did it evolve? Why has
escalation,3 as represented by Ben-Gurion, and not moderation, as
represented by Sharett, held the upper hand for so long?
Touching briefly on a few landmarks of Sharett's personal
history might give us some relevant answers to these intriguing questions.
Sharett was born in 1894 in the city of
After four
difficult years in
As a young boy, Moshe Sharett proved to be a bright pupil in
the regular Russian school he attended. In addition, his father arranged for him
to study Hebrew as well as other Jewish subjects privately.
Under the impact of the 1905-1906 pogroms that swept southern
Once in
Sharett, the young teenager, did not attend school during that
sojourn but rather threw himself into helping his father and two uncles in
running the farmstead, which included an olive-oil press and a flour mill
serving the fellaheen of the area. He now enjoyed schooling in the open
fields with the local villagers who tilled the land and tended the flocks of
sheep and goats. During this time, he especially befriended a young villager by
the name of Abu A'oda, who was the chief steward at the family's farmstead.
This friendship was maintained for many years until the 1948 war raised an
"iron curtain" between
While in Ein Sinya, I met one of the greatest teachers of life
I have ever had. He was Abu A'oda - an illiterate fellah- and it was from him
that I learned Arab colloquialisms and Arab pronunciation, and Arab Muslim
faith, and Arab folklore, and gained a treasure trove of the wisdom of life in
general.
With his natural linguistic talent, which later made him a
polyglot mastering eight languages, young Sharett quickly became fluent in
Arabic. When in 1908, the family moved from hilly
But it was not Arabic alone that the young Sharett absorbed
during those two idyllic years in Ein Sinya. He gained there a firsthand
familiarity with the spirit of Arab rural society. Years later, he said in one
of his lectures: "When told by tourists that their guides stopped at
Ein Sinya to explain that Moshe Sharett was born there, I used to say:
"Yes, it's true. That village is where I was reborn!"
Indeed, one cannot doubt the deep effects of those two
early years on Sharett's later political outlook toward the Arabs, for in Ein
Sinya, he came to regard them not as enemies but as equal human beings, proud
of their culture and heritage. In a seminal lecture he delivered shortly after
his forced resignation from
Your line of thinking regarding the necessity of military reprisals truly astonishes me. When we are hit by a terrorist act and blood is spilt, there is at first a very strong emotional shock. Then there is a political consideration arguing that we cannot sit still and not respond, lest this be interpreted as a sign of weakness. And there is of course also a military consideration demanding an eye for an eye.
But at the same time we seem to be forgetting completely that there are men and women living on the other side of the border, and they too are endowed with brains, and they: too react to our raids in a similar way. I really cannot fathom the way some of us Israelis grasp the situation. It seems I cannot demand from all of you here to have had the same experience I had when I lived surrounded by Arabs in an all-Arab village in order to become aware that Arabs are human beings, that they have brains, rational thought, self-esteem, and human emotions, and are capable of feelings of outrage just like us.
Unquestionably Sharett's early "Arab experience" was
altogether unique when compared with that of his rivals such as Ben-Gurion and
Dayan. A short time after arriving in
Unlike Sharett, these two public figures of the aggressive,
escalationist school never felt comfortable among Arabs, did not empathize with
them; neither did they feel respect towards their culture and mode of life.
Unlike Sharett, neither of them could speak fluent Arabic,
read Arabic newspapers nor listen to Arab radio broadcasts. They belonged, as
the saying goes, to those in
This is not to say that Sharett was oblivious to the basic
Arab-Jewish conflict. He was a committed Zionist and as such, aspired for mass
immigration of Jews from all corners of the world to
But let's retrace our steps.
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During the last year in the Herzliah Gymnasium (high school)
of Tel Aviv, Sharett became an active member of a small coterie of classmates,
each vowing to dedicate his or her life to the implementation of the Zionist
vision in
When the First World War broke out in 1914,
The war over, the 24-year old Sharett decided to resume his
studies.
At this juncture, a pause must be made to register a historic
event in which Sharett participated before leaving for
Sharett stayed in
the capital of the British Empire from 1920 to 1925, majoring in political
economy, mastering the English language, becoming familiar with the English
democratic system, its cultural institutions and high standard of journalism,
and devoting considerable time and energy to political activity in Zionist
circles. He was employed by the Zionist Executive to scan the various Arab
dailies published in the Middle East. In this capacity, he reaped a double
harvest. First, his knowledge of political developments in this area became
more profound. Second, a mutual acquaintance was cultivated between him and the
top echelon of the Zionist leadership - first and foremost Haim Weizmann.
Labor leaders
Ben-Gurion and Katznelson, who visited London several times on party missions
in the early twenties, always met with their younger comrade Sharett. He aided
them as a knowledgeable guide to the intricacies of British politics and
facilitated their contacts with their counterparts in the leadership of the
British Labor party. Although older than Sharett by close to a decade, these
two senior leaders found him to be an intellectual equal. Both of them
maintained a constant correspondence with him.
In September
1921, having read Ben-Gurion's programmatic article in the party's weekly, in
which the latter suggested that members of the party conduct cultural and
political activity among Arab laborers in Palestine in order to divert them
from the negative influence of their anti-Zionist effendis (landlords),
Sharett wrote a significant letter to Ben-Gurion, in which he challenged his
illusionary premises:
Is there really any sense in trying to convince Arab laborers and fellaheen of our right to settle in Palestine? Whose words would prove more convincing to them - ours, the foreigners and the hated, or the words of their sheikhs and effendis, who live right in their midst and command the powerful instruments of racial and national instincts, as well as the effects of common language and of the Muslim faith? Moreover, we have fallen prey to the easy and simplistic illusion of being able to separate the so-called “handful of efffendis” from the “proletarian masses." You should know better: the masses of the Arab fellaheen have no need for the effendis to arouse their national feelings.
In no uncertain
terms, Sharett, a mere university student lacking any status in his party
hierarchy, felt free to criticize its leader Ben-Gurion for his unrealistic
approach. In this very early disagreement with Ben-Gurion he manifested not
only his intellectual integrity and his ability to bring his party leader to
task, but also displayed an incisive and penetrating understanding of the
national character of the nascent Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine.
In 1925, a short
time before his graduation from the London School of Economics and his return
to Palestine, Sharett's A’hdut ha-Avodah party decided to publish a daily
newspaper in Tel Aviv by the name of Davar. When Berl Katznelson, who
initiated this project offered Sharett the post of deputy editor, Sharett
accepted. Filling this post began his rise in the party hierarchy. In addition
to his editorial responsibility for the front page of the newspaper, he started
editing a weekly supplement in English and contributing articles on political
issues to both publications. It was at that time, by dint of those articles,
that his name became known throughout the rank and file of his party and the Yishuv
at large.
In 1931, as a
result of the Labor Party's electoral victory within the World Zionist
Organization, Dr. Haim Arlozorov, a brilliant young intellectual of European
background, was nominated as head of the political department of the Jewish
Agency in Palestine (the operational body of the Zionist movement). Arlozorov,
who knew no Arabic and lacked expertise in Middle Eastern affairs, accepted the
position on condition that Sharett become his assistant. Thus, Sharett moved up
a notch in Mapai's hierarchy.
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Very
characteristically, Sharett's ascent from the domain of journalism to the political
arena was not a result of his own ambition. The post, so to speak, was handed
to him on a platter. It was not a result of his personal desire or politicking.
He was simply offered it in view of his obvious wide-ranging
capabilities, a very similar process to the one in which he was moved up from
his studentship in London to Davar’s editorial board in Tel Aviv.
Indeed, this mode of ascent prevailed throughout Sharett's future political
career. Sharett was not an ambitious climber; he was not a manipulator and
schemer or one who elbowed his way up the careerist ladder while trampling on
others. He gained his prestige and status by his own merit, in a kind of
effortless, natural way. As a boy, he was the best pupil in his class. His
parents adored and pampered him. He never had a head-on clash with his father,
which could have contributed to his personal growth and to his becoming more of
a fighter. When his father died, Sharett, then 18 years old, had not yet
rebelled against him and thus felt a psychological need for a substitute
father. Joining Mapai furnished him with a new home and acquainted him with its
charismatic leaders. In a way, Katznelson, seven years older than he, became a
kind of father-figure for him, and later, when Katznelson died in 1944,
Ben-Gurion, eight years older than Sharett, replaced him as such. It took
Sharett quite a long time before he painfully freed himself completely from
"father" Ben-Gurion.
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In 1933, Haim Arlozorov was murdered or assassinated on the
Tel-Aviv seashore (the murderer has never been identified). It was universally
accepted in Mapai that Sharett should take over his job. From then on, in his
capacity as head of the Jewish Agency's political department - the future
Israel's Ministry for Foreign Affairs - for the next fifteen years until the
end of British mandatory rule in Palestine and the establishment of the Jewish
State in 1948, Sharett and Ben-Gurion, the chairman of the Jewish Agency, on
the whole worked hand in hand in harmony. In spite of several serious conflicts
that erupted between them from time to time, they were united by the great aim
of fortifying the Yishuv with a view towards the attainment of
independence.
One source feeding these occasional clashes was the delicate
relationship within the leading triumvirate of the Zionist Organization:
Weizmann-Ben-Gurion-Sharett. World-renowned Dr. Haim Weizmann, President of the
Zionist Organization, was the moderate of the three. Ben-Gurion was the
extremist. Sharett, the junior of the three, steered his rational and pragmatic
course between his two senior colleagues. Ben-Gurion found it difficult to
accept Sharett's independence of mind. At one point during 1943, when Sharett
clearly sided with Weizmann, Ben-Gurion exploded and, treating Sharett as a defector
from his camp, stopped talking to him for several weeks. Subsequently, they
patched up this rift, but it seems that, ever after, they ceased to feel
comfortable and spontaneous with each other. In later years, when once
referring to that episode, Sharett said: "I compare our relationship to
a priceless crystal vessel. It suffered a crack. It remained usable as before,
but the crack, an irreparable one, remained there." As far as
Ben-Gurion was concerned, he no longer seemed to view his relationship with
Sharett as real cooperation but rather as a tentative "coalition."
However, Ben-Gurion and Sharett presented a united front
vis-à-vis the British government in London and in Palestine. In 1936,
they both accepted the recommendation of the Royal Commission headed by Lord
Peel to partition Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state. When World
War II broke out, they both called upon Palestinian Jews to volunteer for
service in the British army in order to fight the common enemy, Nazi Germany.
Once the war was over, they were in full agreement that the time was ripe for
an unconditional demand for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.
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Somewhat paradoxically, it was after the great realization of
the cherished dream - the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948 -
that the Ben-Gurion-Sharett coalition began to totter. A new situation
altogether faced Ben-Gurion, now Prime Minister and Defense Minister, and
Sharett, now Foreign Minister. Until now, they had headed a political movement,
the aim of which was to attain Jewish sovereignty over a maximum portion of
Palestine, a country populated by an Arab majority and ruled by a foreign,
colonial power. However, once the main goal was achieved and the State of
Israel was born, it was extremely clear to Foreign Minister Sharett that a
complete and basic change had occurred in the state of affairs. As a sovereign
state, a recognized member of the international community, and as a member of
the United Nations, Israel could not continue to behave as an ideological
organization or as a parochial community. Achieving statehood meant, in
Sharett's view, that Israel must abide by international law, respect the
sovereignty and the borders of its neighbors, and accept as conclusive its own
borders as defined by the final results of the War of Independence.
In other words, while in the pre-state era when ruled by the
British Empire the Zionists were constantly trying to expand their territorial
gains by purchasing land for the Yishuv, the State of Israel, by virtue
of its becoming sovereign and a member of the UN, could no longer pursue an
expansionist policy. Sharett accepted the dictum that World War II and the
establishment of the United Nations Organization had ended the era of
colonialism and territorial expansionism by force.
It seems, though, that this kind of basic change was not
equally internalized by many Israeli leaders, most prominently Ben-Gurion, nor
by the Israeli public at large. Ben-Gurion, for example, refused to define
Israel's borders in its Proclamation of Independence. He also minimized the
part played by the UN in the establishment of Israel and referred to the power
of this organization with a great measure of reserve, even to the point of
calling it by disparaging nicknames. Another example of this turn of mind was
given evidence in his keynote speech on Israel's seventh Independence Day, in
which he proclaimed: "Our future does not depend on what the gentiles say
but on what the Jews do!" Sharett outraged upon hearing this demagoguery,
argued that common sense dictated that Israel's future depended both on what
gentiles and Jews said and on what gentiles and Jews did. One could clearly
discern here the deep and widening gulf between the two leaders.
Sharett, by nature a rationalist and by position and capacity
keenly aware of the do's and don'ts governing the international arena, wanted
Israel to behave as a normal state. The achievement of statehood, to his mind,
had a price tag attached to it: no more expansion, recognition of international
rights as well as duties, respecting UN decisions and mediations, pursuing a
non-aggressive policy toward neighboring states, and charting a policy striving
for peace in the Middle East. Moreover, having devoted all of his time and
energies toward the attainment of the November 29, 1947 decision in the General
Assembly of the UN to partition Palestine and later to accept the State of
Israel into the UN, Sharett argued that the special emphasis on the moral right
of the Jewish people to build a sovereign state of its own, which had played a
major role in prevailing upon UN members to grant the larger part of Palestine
to the proposed Jewish state, obliged it to abstain from pursuing policies that
could be defined as immoral. Otherwise it was bound to destroy the very
foundation of and justification for its establishment.
Generally speaking, Ben-Gurion, a man of vision, felt much
less bound by mundane considerations. He saw history as a flow of time
punctuated by sudden opportunities to be seized upon for establishing faits
accomplis. Level-headed Sharett was not oblivious to historical
opportunities, but he argued that once the miraculous advent of Israel had
occurred, and once the majority of UN members had recognized the increase of
its territory resulting from its victory over the various Arab armies that had
tried to destroy it while defying the UN decision of November 29, 1947 to
partition Palestine, Israel should refrain from future adventurous political
and military operations, to say nothing of further expanding its territory.
Ben-Gurion disagreed. His political philosophy harbored a messianic strain,
manifested time and again in his urge to engage militarily in geopolitical
changes that would expand Israel's territory in the southern, eastern and
northern borders.
It seems appropriate to cite here from historian Michael
Brecher's interview with Sharett, where Sharett delineated the differences
between himself and Ben-Gurion: "I am quiet, reserved, and careful.
Ben-Gurion is impulsive, impetuous and intuitive. My capital C is Caution;
Ben-Gurion's capital C is Courage." On another occasion, right after
the Anglo-French-Israeli collusion in the 1956 War (which had been the reason
for Sharett's forced resignation from government), he said in all insightful
frankness:
As it appears that standing at this country's helm entails adventurism and deception, and seeing that I am not able to do either, it follows that I am not fit for that position. My nature dictates that I consider the risks and not rush into an adventure. I shall be cautious and not tempt fate. Therefore, I shall not lie, nor instruct others to lie. This is neither an expression of self-righteousness nor show of it. It is an admission of my limitations and their acknowledgment. There is a chasm between our political thinking and actions - they do not converge. Israel is being led down a road that is not mine. Things have gone too far - incontestable facts are being established. The new historic facts cannot be altered. I had nothing to do with them. I had control only over myself. Fundamental conceptions have been adopted that cannot be remedied in this generation, and in any event, the next generation will not be mine. I am prepared to assume that in the end, history will justify both the deception and the adventurous campaign. Be it as it may, there is one thing I am certain about: I, Moshe Sharett, am incapable of these deeds. I therefore cannot stand at the helm of this country.
During the War of Independence, when at one juncture
Ben-Gurion's proposal to his cabinet that the IDF exploit a certain opportunity
and occupy the southern part of the West Bank was outvoted by a majority of one
- that of Sharett - Ben-Gurion was deeply annoyed and later accused Sharett
more than once of being responsible for that missed opportunity about which
“generations will mourn."
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After Israel's swift occupation of the Sinai Peninsula in the
Suez War of 1956 (the Sinai Campaign), Ben-Gurion announced that this area
never really belonged to Egypt to begin with, and should remain in Israeli
hands. This step was indeed in full accordance with his messianic approach to realpolitik.
At the time, Sharett was no longer a cabinet member - having
been forced to tender his resignation a few months prior to the outbreak of the
war, as mentioned above. However, there is no doubt that he would have
vehemently opposed going into that war, to say nothing of Ben-Gurion's
predilection for territorial expansion.
A not altogether dissimilar instance had occurred about two
years earlier, in February 1954, when Minister of Defense Pinhas Lavon and
Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan pressed for the military annexation of a strip of
Southern Lebanon and for the establishment there of a Christian state, which
would, undoubtedly in their view, make peace with Israel. At the time,
Ben-Gurion, then out of government and staying at kibbutz Sde Boker in the
distant Negev, pulled his weight to prevail on the cabinet to accept this
expansionist plan. Sharett, then Prime Minister, simply vetoed it. In a
personal letter to Ben-Gurion he said:
Is there any chance that the Arab League would accept the annexation of southern Lebanon? Could one surmise that the bloody war which would inevitably erupt as a result of our attempt would be limited to Lebanon only and would not involve Syria as well? And what about the Western Powers? Would they behave as passive onlookers in view of this geo-political upheaval? I am afraid that an attempt on our part to arouse the non-existent wish of the Lebanese Christians for a separate Christian state in Lebanon would be seen as proof of our shallow and rash thinking, if not as an adventurous speculation with the peaceful life and independence of another people. No power on earth will reduce Lebanon back to its limited pre-World War I size. I am against any such adventure which is bound to end only in disgrace. It is a crazy adventure.
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To reiterate: once the State of Israel was established, a clash between levelheaded, moderate, and cautious Sharett and volatile, messianic Ben-Gurion was inevitable. The problem facing Israel's leadership was the nature of its policy toward the Arab world, or, in other words, what was the most effective policy to achieve peace with the Arab world at the earliest possible moment. Here Sharett and Ben-Gurion clearly differed. Ben-Gurion was convinced that the Arab states, which attacked Israel on the morrow of its establishment with the clear aim of annihilating it, were planning a "second round" to compensate for their humiliating defeat in 1949. In order to prevent this military revenge, Israel must prove to the Arabs its preponderant military strength time and again. Any sign of Israeli weakness would immediately entice Arab aggression. In view of this consideration, Ben-Gurion was given to a policy of constant “retaliation." Each incident of Arab incursion into Israel on any of its long borders with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt must be responded to immediately with a military blow. Eventually, once the Arabs realized that they had no chance of vanquishing Israel, they would accept its existence in their midst. Only then would they be prepared to make peace with Israel.
Ben-Gurion went a step further. According to his line of
thinking, it might very well be that this series of military retaliations would
not suffice. At a certain point, then, a preventive war against all or one of
the Arab states would become inevitable. It is indeed not clear whether this
reasoning originated with Ben-Gurion or with Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, who
had a far-reaching influence over him. It was Dayan's tenet that the War of
Independence had not "ended" as it should have with the IDF's
reaching the River Jordan and making it Israel's "natural" eastern
border. It was only natural that the ideas of these two influential men were
directly, as well as indirectly, absorbed by the combined Israeli military and
defense system, forming the most formidable establishment in Israel, filling
them with the sense of a great national mission.
Sharett's political philosophy clashed head-on with the above.
His course of thinking did not follow from the present to the future, but on
the contrary, from the future to the present. While acutely cognizant of the
Arabs' spirit of revenge towards Israel, he reasoned that since Israel was
forever destined to be a small, non-Arab island in the vast Arab ocean, and
since ultimately it must reach peace with its neighbors, for it could not live
by the sword forever, Israel should, from the outset pursue a de-escalatory
policy calculated to blunt the sting of their 1948-1949 trauma. The Arabs must
be given time to heal their wounds and come to terms with the new Middle East
reality created by the cataclysmic emergence of Israel. Each military blow
Israel inflicted on any of the Arab states could not but revive that old
trauma, could not but regenerate the Arabs' feelings of humiliation, hatred,
and revenge, and thus postpone ever further, if not indefinitely, the moment of
their readiness to make peace. If Israel really sought peace, it follows that
it must demonstrate moderation, not aggression; compromise, not belligerency;
restraint, not impulsive behavior - and the sooner the better, before it became
too late to put down the rising flames of Arab hatred and revenge.
Sharett was outraged by the spirit of revenge and retaliation
that was generally rampant among the commanding officers in the IDF. A modern
state, he argued, cannot behave as a Bedouin tribe in the wild desert. "These
men are beyond me," he wrote in his diary about the IDF
officers. "They have grown accustomed to the idea that the army's
morale cannot be sustained without giving license to vent its emotions by blood
letting from time to time."
Following a bloody incident in which a Jewish settler in a border area was murdered by an Arab infiltrator, Sharett the public-minded statesman, could not ignore outraged public opinion over a chain of such incidents and therefore, against his better judgment, approved a military retaliation. On the same day, he confided in his diary:
This murder was considered the last straw, and anger must be assuaged. This is the only logic, and none other. From a security point of view I do not believe that retaliation will make the slightest difference. On the contrary, I fear that it will ignite a new chain of bloodshed in the border area. The edifice I have tenaciously taken pains to construct for the past months and all the measures of restraints I tried to install against Israeli retaliatory steps - all this is liable to be wiped out in one fell swoop. Come what may, I feel that I have no alternative.
Whether or not Sharett was right in this prognosis, he was practically alone in calling for its implementation. Even after Ben-Gurion's surprising retirement from the government at the end of 1953, paving the way for his replacement by his second-in-command, Sharett's premiership was untenable. For one thing, although Ben-Gurion kept to his distant kibbutz in the Negev, it was common knowledge that his sojourn there was only temporary. For another, Ben-Gurion fully backed the Chief of Staff, namely the influential Moshe Dayan. And moreover, the latter fomented his own political-military agenda, which resulted in his policy of aggravating the situation on the borders. In this imbroglio, it was only natural that Sharett would face grave, if not insurmountable, difficulties in his efforts to rein in the IDF.
Still, as evident from his diary, on assuming office, Sharett
planned to put an end to the IDF's prognosis, i.e., that Egypt was planning a
war against Israel. He wished to replace that prognosis, with its ensuing
conclusions, by non-military means such as “activating solutions to the
refugee problem by bold and concrete offers on war part to pay compensation;
restoring good relations with the great powers; and ceaseless endeavor to reach
an understanding with Egypt. Each of these courses of action,"
he wrote on October 10, 1953, “is liable to take us into unknown avenues,
and yet we are not exempt from striving towards them."
It is important to bear in mind that Sharett's tenure of less
than two years as Prime Minister was not only fraught with obvious, objective
difficulties but was also too short-lived. Thus, he never did really have a
“fighting chance" to implement his political agenda As if to prove
Sharett's precarious position, a most unhealthy situation evolved in February-
1955, when Ben-Gurion, in the wake of the forced resignation of Defense
Minister Pinhas Lavon, returned from Sde Boker to become Minister of Defense
once again, under Sharett's premiership. This unhealthy situation was corrected
a few months later, when following the general elections of July 1955,
Ben-Gurion regained his former premiership. Sharett, acknowledging Ben-Gurion's
seniority, remained in Ben-Gurion's new cabinet as Foreign Minister but was
cruelly torn between his desire to serve as a moderate balancing weight in the
new political constellation and his clear awareness of his political weakness
opposite the revived Ben-Gurion-Dayan coalition. It was obvious to all
political observers that his days in government were numbered.
Sharett himself was certainly aware of the personal
consequences his opposition to the stronger Ben-Gurion must inevitably bring
about. His moral integrity and political philosophy led him time and again to
clash with Ben-Gurion - before Ben-Gurion became Prime Minister again, as well
as afterwards. Even though he was not a charismatic and feared leader as was
his opponent, Sharett fought with all his weight against a series of Ben Gurion's
proposals in the cabinet to approve military retaliations against Israel's
neighbors, and outvoted Ben-Gurion at least four times, thus thwarting major
operations (such as the capturing of the whole Gaza Strip, or of the
Eilat-Sharm-A-Sheihk strip on the Red Sea). It was only natural that the
frustration that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion suffered at Sharett's hands would
exacerbate their relations even further.
But while Sharett succeeded several times in carrying the
majority of cabinet members with him, he was not prepared to bring about a
showdown between himself and Ben-Gurion in the higher institutions of their
common party of Mapai. For Sharett was essentially not an ambitious politician
aiming at reaching the top. He had no autocratic strain in his personality;
consequently, he was neither a feared nor adored leader inside or outside
Israel. When elected Prime Minister, he told his colleagues that he would like
to operate on the basis of constant consultation and cooperation with them.
(When one of them retorted that he should hope that the gentiles would not
stand in his way, he said: "Let's pray that the Jews do not stand in my
way!") Inevitably, this position of Sharett's weakened his leadership
right from the start of his premiership. His followers were numbered, all
others gravitated towards the seat of power, occupied by Ben-Gurion, the
autocratic, charismatic, feared and worshiped leader, who generally found it
superfluous to consult with anybody but himself.
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In one major case, Sharett the Prime Minister failed to thwart
Minister of Defense Ben-Gurion's proposal for a military retaliation against
Egypt when he gave his approval to the so-called “Gaza Raid," in which an
IDF elite unit, commanded by Ariel Sharon, attacked an Egyptian army camp on
February 28, 1955, killing more than 40 soldiers. Sharett deeply regretted
afterwards the approval he had given for this operation (as it turned out, its
scope was enlarged without consulting him), but the far-reaching damage was
done: Nasser, his army put to shame, decided to buttress his military might and
speedily purchased a great deal of arms from the Soviet Union, thus giving a
fateful push to the arms-race in the region.
In view of the gradual implementation of the Egyptian-Soviet
arms deal, IDF experts assumed the modernized Egyptian army would be ready to
initiate a heavy military strike against Israel by mid-June 1956. Dayan and
Ben-Gurion started to consider waging a preventive war against Egypt before it
because too formidable to overwhelm. However, Ben-Gurion was fully aware that
in the event, he could expect Sharett's unquestionable opposition to this plan,
and that with his powerful reasoning and eloquence, the latter could sway the
majority of the cabinet to side with him on this occasion too. Moreover,
Ben-Gurion was aware that in view of Sharett's prestigious position in the
cabinet, in Mapai, and in the public at large, it would be heedless of him to
conceal from him his secret war plan (as he eventually concealed it from most
of his ministers almost to the last moment). Ben-Gurion's only way out of this
complication was to get rid of his opponent. In mid-June 1956, Ben-Gurion
presented an ultimatum to the presidium of Mapai - either he or Sharett - the
party had to choose between the two. If Sharett were to stay on, he,
Ben-Gurion, would resign immediately.
The party's choice was predictable. Ben-Gurion won the day.
Sharett tendered his resignation. Though he believed he had a reasonable chance
of convincing Mapai's General Committee of the soundness of his policy of
moderation and of the basic mistake involved in opting for a war in which
Israel would be the obvious instigator and obvious aggressor, Sharett
characteristically desisted from fighting back He reasoned, perhaps correctly,
that in that case, it was not too farfetched to surmise that Ben-Gurion, being
backed by the IDF top echelon and the whole defense establishment, would
continue to fight him. The result would be a devastating split in Mapai that
would make his position as Prime Minister untenable. Moreover, during that
momentous event of Ben-Gurion's ultimatum, none of Sharett's Mapai colleagues
in the Cabinet sided with him. They were all under Ben-Gurion's charismatic
spell. Sharett, a lonely, single, real dove in the midst of these warlike
hawks, asked himself: "Suppose I do win the rank and file of the Party,
can I go on collaborating with these colleagues, who have just succumbed to
Ben-Gurion's ultimatum and agreed with his aggressive, escalationist policy?"
Thus, on June 18, 1956, he preferred to resign.
What Sharett did not know was that during the last few months
of his tenure in Ben-Gurion's government as Foreign Minister, representatives
of the Defense Ministry, at Ben-Gurion's direction, had begun clandestine talks
with their French counterparts in order to amalgamate their collusion aimed
toward toppling President Nasser. It was in this context that on June 22, only
four days after Sharett's forced resignation, an Israeli mission - established
while Sharett was still at the helm of his Ministry - headed by Chief of Staff
Moshe Dayan and General Director of the Ministry of Defense Shimon Peres, flew
to France where they agreed to cooperate militarily with France against
Nasser's Egypt. Little did Sharett know, at the time of his forced resignation,
that Ben-Gurion and Dayan had already decided that war against Egypt was
unavoidable, and that thus he was destined to be its first victim. Sharett
understood this only too late when he laid bare his thoughts in an entry in his
diary on November 3, 1956: “Who was to know if these plans had not been
germinating for a long time, and whether or not they had been part and parcel
of the original cause for my dismissal at the time it had occurred?"
And on December 2, he added:
It is possible that from an historical and objective standpoint, the nation was ordained, as it were, to seize upon this course of action of the Sinai Operation, and on none other. Who is a prophet to tell? But whatever the truth may be, it was evident to all that the operation and the victory involved casualties and losses and new dangers - in all aspects and on all fronts. It was also clear to me that I was one of the casualties. As a statesman, I have fallen in the battle, and that loss should be recorded as well.
But was Sharett the man the real victim of this fateful
military action - of this firstt optional war of Israel, called in its annals
“The Sinai Campaign"? Or was it his policy of moderation that was
annihilated on the battlefield? Sharett the man and statesman was certainly
removed from Israel's political arena. As an individual, he forever lost his
prestigious position. But looking at it from another angle, with his departure,
did not Israel lose - and for many years to come - a balancing weight, a force
capable of curbing aggressive and expansionist impulses, of preventing useless,
superfluous wars?
The question is easier to ask than to answer. It seems that we
are confronted here with perhaps one of the greatest "ifs" of
Israel's history. And surely one could also ask whether a moderate, rational
statesman, by definition, must always be the weaker party
vis-à-vis the self-assured political extremist and rouser of emotions.
Still, the future series of wars and min-wars and Intifidas
which befell Israel ever since the 1956 War seem to indicate that while the man
and statesman Moshe Sharett has gone into almost total eclipse, his conceptions
of moderation and of conflict management are too obstinate to vanish. Indeed,
they seem to be ideas and ideals searching for a leadership of integrity, high
moral principles, courage and eloquence, around which the people should rally -
a leadership that Israel seems painfully unable to produce.
Notes:
1.
Ben-Gurion (1855-1972), Israel's first Prime Minister (1948-1953; 1955-1965)
and Defensese Minister (1948-1953; 1954-1963), advocated escalation. Sharett
(1894-1965), Israel's first Foreign Minister (1948-1956) and its second Prime
Minister (1954-1955), advocated moderation. In the seven years following 1949,
these two leaders, each doing his utmost to make Israel pursue what he
understood as the necessary and right course to be taken by the young state
towards its Arab neighboring states, clashed incessantly. Their rivalry deepened
and developed into bitter animosity till a showdown became inevitable. In June
1956, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, the more powerful of the two, forced Foreign
Minister Sharett to resign his cabinet post. Thus, the Israeli school of
escalation finally and completely overcame that of moderation, proof of which
was the first optional war Israel waged in October 1956 against Egypt, its
southern Arab neighbor.
2. In
other words, Sharett developed his ideas of moderation and of conflict
managament not under the impact of the wars of 1956, 1967, and those later wars
of 1973 and 1982, or under the impact of the first and second lntifadas.
He did not need to acquire the acute, cumulative awareness of the outcomes of
all of these wars in terms of the futile waste of human lives and economic
resources, of personal agonies and public torment, in order to reach the
understanding that no nation on earth can live by the sword forever - and that
Israel is no exeption to the rule. (It is interesting to note that quite a few Israeli
”escalationists” or “hawks” -such as Moshe Dylan, Itzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres
and Ezer Weizmann, to name the most famous – changed thir politica; hardline
outlook to become moderates or “doves” only after years of military service and
staunch belief in military prowess and agressive solutions to the conflict.)
3. A
considerable number of historians and observers attribute this term to the 1956
war, since that was Israel’s first war of choice and demonstrated a deliberate
intention of territorial expansion.